Abstract. No quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol has been proved fully secure. A remaining problem is the eavesdropper's ability to make coherent measurements on the joint properties of large composite systems. This problem has been recently solved by Yao in the case of the security of a quantum oblivious transfer (QOT ) protocol. We consider an extended OT task which, in addition to Alice and Bob, includes an eavesdropper Eve among the participants. An honest Eve is inactive and receives no information at all about Alice's input when Bob and Alice are honest. We prove that the security of a QOT protocol against Bob implies its security against Eve as well as the security of a QKD protocol.
Introduction
The goal of quantum cryptography is to design cryptographic protocols that are secure against unlimited quantum or classical computational power. At present, the quantum protocols that have been designed are commitment BC, BCJL] , oblivious transfer Cr87, Cr94, BBCS, MS, Yao] , key distribution BB84, BBBSS, BBBW] and identi cation CS] . Furthermore, prototypes for implementing some of these protocols have been built BBBSS, MT, To94, TRT1, TRT2] .
However, the full security of some of these protocols has not yet been proved. One of the di culties in providing a full security proof is the cheaters' ability to execute coherent measurements on many photons at a time. At present, security against coherent measurements has been obtained in the case of commitment BCJL] and bit oblivious transfer Yao]. The security of QKD against coherent measurements has not yet been addressed in the literature and it is not clear whether the techniques used by Yao in Yao] for a QOT protocol may be easily used for a QKD protocol. In any case, we do not use Yao's techniques. We show that the security against Bob of a QOT protocol implies its security against eavesdropping and, as a corollary, the security of a key distribution protocol.
The level of security against eavesdropping that we obtain for QOT (and QKD) depends upon the level of security of QOT against Bob, and, in particular, full security against Bob implies full security against eavesdropping.
The security of a QOT protocol against an eavesdroper is interesting in itself because it allows the protocol to be executed securely over a long quantum channel by an honest Alice and an honest Bob. The above implication works with a string QOT protocol, that is, a QOT protocol that transfers a string rather than only a single bit. The implication requires that the QOT protocol tolerates errors in the quantum channel and that the classical announcements in the QKD protocol are made on a faithful public channel between Alice and Bob. It does not require any unrealistic physical assumption such as zero error in the quantum channel.
2 The QOT protocol and the security of OT There are two types of OT: the ordinary OT and the ? 1 2 -OT . We consider the string version of both types. In the ordinary OT, Alice inputs a string s, Bob receives a random bit c 2 f0; 1g and, if c = 0, the string s. In the ? 1 2 -OT , Alice inputs two string s 1 and s 2 , Bob inputs a bit c B and receives the string s cB .
In this paper, from the security against Bob and tolerance against errors of an ordinary QOT protocol, we obtain its security against Eve and, as a corollary, the security of a QKD protocol. This is signi cant in particular because Yao has proved the security against Bob of an ordinary QOT protocol Yao].
The protocol
In the discussion below, a dishonest Bob and a dishonest Eve, have been included.
Both appear in the same description, but the security of the protocol against any one of them is based upon the assumption that the other is inactive. For b; 2 f0; 1g, let jbi be the state of a photon polarized at b 90 + 45 degrees. In the BB84 coding scheme, b is the bit coded in the state jbi and determines the basis used to code this bit: = 0 corresponds to the basis f0 ; 90 g whereas = 1 corresponds to the basis f45 ; 135 and publicly announces this ordered pair. For our proof, it is convenient to consider that Bob's deterministic algorithm to compute (e 0 ; e 1 ) returns the same output if^ and c B are both complemented (this is easy to accomplish).
Dishonest Bob: Having learnt the string , he executes a rst post-test measurement of his choice and uses the outcome to compute an ordered pair (e 0 ; e 1 ) such that e 0 e 1 = fijopen i = 0g and j#e 0 ? #e 1 j 1, and publicly announces the ordered pair.
For all d 2 f0; 1g, the string coded by Alice in e d is denoted w d . 6 Alice: She chooses and publicly announces a random bit c A and a hash function g from f0; 1g #ec A to f0; 1g r . The integer r is the length of the string to be sent via QOT. She also publicly announces a = g(w cA ) s and Syn(w cA ), the syndrome of w cA which is needed by Bob for error correction. The remainder of the section contains the formal de nitions of security that we use in our proof. As for the de nition of security for ? 1 2 -OT found in Cr94], our de nitions are formulated in terms of the amount of information received by a given participant. Any initial information about s that may have this participant, Bob in sections 2.2 and 2.4 and Eve in section 2.3, corresponds to an apriori probability distribution on S which is implicit in our de nitions.
Due to their relative complexity, we understand that the reader may have the impression that the following de nitions are more complicated than necessary. However, these are the most simple and yet complete de nitions that we could express in terms of mutual information. A more complete discussion on this subject, including a connection with de nitions expressed in terms of statistical indistinguishability, will appear in another paper.
Security of OT against Bob
Let V Bob represents all the information received or generated by Bob in the protocol. A QOT protocol is secure against Bob if (9 > 0)(9n 0 ) such that, (8n > n 0 ), for every Bob, for every Channel, there exists a binary random Let us remark that at step 5 a dishonest Bob does not even have to choose a bit C B . If Bob does not choose a bit C B , the bit C = C A C B associated with an honest Bob is meaningless. Therefore, in the above de nition,C has, in general, nothing to do with the bit C associated with an honest Bob. 3 From Bob to Eve
In this section we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The security against Bob and tolerance against errors of the above protocol implies its security against Eve.
Looking ahead to an extension of this result to QKD, we shall be generous and assume that Eve receives^ and C B at the same time as she receives the pair (E 0 ; E 1 ) (which is thus redundant). The following general purpose lemma is useful.
Lemma 2. Let Proof of Theorem 1. Let and n 0 be the parameters for the security against Bob. Let 0 and n 0 0 be the parameters for the tolerance. Let m = Maxf ; 0 g and n m be such that r 2 ?( m=3)nm < 1 6 :
We shall see that n 00 0 = Maxfn 0 ; n 0 0 ; n m g and 00 = m =3 are adequate parameters for the security against Eve. Partitioning I(S; V Eve ) over Pass we obtain I(S; V Eve ) = I(S; V Eve jPass = 0) Pr(P ass = 0) +I(S; V Eve jPass = 1) Pr(P ass = 1) +I(S; Pass)
Using 3 and 4 and the fact that V Eve is a subset of V Bob we obtain I(S; V Eve ) = 2 2 ? mn + I(S; V Eve jPass = 1) Pr(P ass = 1):
We only have to take care of the last term. Partitioning the last term over Using propositions 3 and 4 we obtain the security against Eve. We shall prove these propositions in the remainder of this section.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us consider any integer n > n 00 0 , any Channel and any Eve. Let us consider a Bob that executes Eve's actions in addition to his honest actions. Because V Eve is a subset of V Bob , it will be enough to show that I(S; V Bob jC = 1) Pr(P ass = 1) 2 ? 00 n :
The basic idea of the proof is simply that, because tolerance against error implies that Bob must receive S each time that C = 0 and security against Bob implies that he cannot receive S more than half of the time, then Bob cannot receive S when C = 1. The remainder of the proof expresses this idea more formally in a way that takes care of additional points related to the test. By contradiction, let us assume that I(S; V Bob jC = 1) Pr(P ass = 1) > 2 ? 
Summing inequalities 14, 15 and 16, one easily obtains 11. This concludes the proof of proposition 3.
To prove proposition 4, the following lemma is useful.
Lemma5. Let Let p n = Pr(X = x) = 1 2 4 4n . For every Eve 1 , using a partition over X and the relation I(S; XjC = c) = 0 to obtain the rst equality, lemma 5 to obtain the second equality and the bijectivity of F on X to obtain the third equality, we have:
; V
Eve jC Note that (S; Z) is a function of (U; Y ). Therefore, we are done if we may de ne Eve 1 's strategy at steps 2 and 8 such that the distribution of (U (0) ; Y (0) ) given (X; C) (0) = (x; 0) is identical to the distribution of (U (1) ; Y (1) ) given (X; C) (1) = (F (x); 1). Let us consider an execution under Eve 0 where (X; C) (0) = (x; c) and an execution under Eve 1 where (X; C) (1) = (F (x); c) = F(x; c). For every Eve 1 's strategy, because Alice acts exactly in the same way in both executions and U is invariant under F, we have that U (0) in Eve 0 execution is identical to U (1) in Eve 1 execution. Now, we x the value of U and consider the random variable Y . We must construct Eve 1 's strategy such that the distribution of Y (0) given (U; X; C) (0) = (u; x; c) is the same as the distribution of Y (1) given F(U; X; C) (1) = (u; x; c). At step 2, we de ne Eve 1 such that she executes the same transfer of information as Eve 0 . This is a natural choice because, at this step, (Y; C) is unknown and Eve 1 cannot make use of the di erence between the above conditions. We obtain that the random variable Error behaves in the same way in both executions because { Bob's outcomes at positions that are used for the test are independent of Bob's choice of bases at positions that are not used for the test and { Eve 1 has tampered the photons in the same way as Eve 0 . We now x the value of Error. At step 8, Eve 1 with the view V Eve . In other words, in these two distinct executions, Eve 0 and Eve 1 act in exactly the same way. The distribution of the random variable J Eve must be the same in both case, because they have executed the same transfer of information and the same measurement, and Alice has sent the same state. This concludes the proof of proposition 4 and theorem 1.
Security of QKD
The QKD protocol is exactly the QOT protocol, where Bob announces^ and C B , and Alice always chooses C = 0 (C A = C B ). The security of this QKD protocol is a direct consequence of proposition 4.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the security of an ordinary QOT protocol and its tolerance against error implies its security against eavesdropping and, as a corollary, the security of a QKD protocol. It would have been reasonnable to better explain our formal de nitions of security that appear in section 2. Ideally, we should have explained the connection between these de nitions and previous de nitions found in the literature such as those found in Cr90]. As mentioned before, an analysis of these de nitions will be presented in a subsequent paper.
Finally, now that we know that security may be obtained, it will be useful to determine the maximal error rate that can be tolerated and, for a given error rate, how much resource is required to guarantee a desired level of security. We need this information to nd out what kind of technology is required to realize quantum protocols that are e cient and secure. To our knowledge, some theoretical work remains yet to be done at this level, at the least for QOT and QKD. This article was processed using the L a T E X macro package with LLNCS style
